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**GOVERNMENT OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC  
State Planning Commission**

**&**

**THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME**

**Project Title:**

**"Study on Impact of Subsidization of Agricultural Production on Development: Poverty and Social Impact Analysis"**

**Project number SYR/06/011**

**Brief Description**

The project intends to support the Syrian Government in the ex-ante evaluation of the distributional impact of reforms concerning the pricing and marketing mechanisms for strategic crops. This step is crucial to ensure that poverty and social considerations are appropriately reflected in economic policy decision-making, and openly debated among stakeholders to favor the consensus building.

Adopting a "learning-by-doing approach", the project also aims at strengthening the ownership of national authorities on the PSIA tools and processes, so that they may be replicated and adapted to other types of economic reforms.

This optic is reflected into three main project outputs:

- (I) Building in-country capacity to carry out PSIA initiatives;
- (II) Analyzing economic policies concerning strategic crops, with particular attention to the distributional and social impact of reforms;
- (III) Disseminating the findings of PSIA, and fostering public debate about reforms.

SIGNATURE PAGE

Country: **Syrian Arab Republic**  
UNDAF Outcome(s)

1.1 Social protection strengthened and better targeted.  
(Output 1.1.2)

Expected Outcome(s):

Social and distributional impact of reforms in the agricultural sector assessed by the national authorities and debated among stakeholders.

Expected Output(s):

- 1) In-country capacity to carry out PSIA initiatives created, both at managerial and at technical level.
- 2) Economic policies concerning strategic crops analyzed, with particular attention to the distributional and social impact of reforms.
- 3) Findings of PSIA on strategic crops disseminated, and public debate about reforms fostered among stakeholders.

Implementing Partner: **United Nations Office for Project Services, New York (UNOPS)**

Other Partners: **Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, State Planning Commission**

<p>Programme Period: <b>October 2006 – October 2007</b></p> <p>Programme Component: <b>Poverty Reduction</b></p> <p>Project Title: <b>Study on Impact of Subsidization of Agricultural Production on Development: Poverty and Social Impact Analysis</b></p> <p>Project ID: <b>SYR/06/011</b></p> <p>Project Duration: <b>1 year</b></p> <p>Management Arrangement: <b>OPS Execution</b></p>	<p>Programme budget: <b>US\$ 177,143</b></p> <p>General Management Support Fee: <b>US\$ 2,857</b></p> <p>Total Project Budget: <b>US\$ 180,000</b></p> <p>Allocated resources:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BTF: <b>US\$ 100,000</b></li> <li>• Prog. C-S: <b>US\$ 60,000 *</b></li> <li>• UNDP: <b>US\$ 20,000</b></li> <li>• 20,000 In-Kind Contribution (Ministry of Agriculture &amp; Agrarian Reform)</li> </ul> <p>* To be paid in Syrian Pounds<sup>1</sup></p>
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**Agreed by H.E. Mr. Abdallah Al-Dardari,**  
Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs  
Head of the State Planning Commission  
On behalf of the Syrian Government

Signature: .....

Date: .....

**Agreed by H.E. Dr. Adel Safar**

Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform,  
On behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform

Signature: .....

Date: **16/10/2006**

**Agreed by Mr. Ali Al-Za'tari,**  
Resident Representative, UNDP.

Signature: .....

Date: **16 Oct. 2006**

**Agreed by Mr. Joseph P. Saba**

Representative, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

Signature: .....

Date: **16 October 2006**

<sup>1</sup> The UN exchange rate prevailing at the signature date of the project document is US\$ 1 = SP 51.70

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

DPMEA	Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs
FYP	Five Year Plan
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MAAR	Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MYFF	Multi-year Funding Framework
PSIA	Poverty and Social Impact Analysis
RFP	Request for Proposal
SPC	State Planning Commission
SRF	Strategic Results Framework
TOR	Terms of Reference

*Rationale for Poverty and Social Impact Analysis on strategic crops in Syria*

Since the early 60's the Syrian government has employed National Five-Year-Plans supplemented by Annual Executive Plans, in order to steer farmers to the pattern of land use perceived as the most apt to meet national objectives. By means of a variety of mechanisms, ranging from licensing for planting specific areas to direct marketing and from price-setting to preferential access to state-supplied inputs and credit, the Syrian government has intervened extensively in the agricultural sector, trying to create a structure of incentives able to achieve food self-sufficiency and ensure a cheap access to food items.

Despite the fact that the intensity of state intervention in agriculture has been progressively decreasing in the last years, government involvement is still pervasive enough to alter the outcome of market forces and the production decision-making of private farmers (who account for over 95% of national agricultural production). In fact, while government intervention in strategic crops' market reflects the strategic aims of achieving food self-sufficiency, supporting universal access to food (MDG 1) and reducing urban-rural income disparities, these objectives have been reached at a very high cost for government budget. Hence, Syrian transition from a mixed system to a system relying more heavily on market signals presents new challenges and management problems, and needs to be analyzed with great care, bearing in mind, not only, the objective of economic efficiency but also those of poverty eradication and of equitable distribution.

The planned PSIA is a step in this direction, and will contribute greatly to a deeper knowledge of the social and distributional impact of the proposed reforms in the management of agricultural policies.

The PSIA will focus on analyzing the subsidies and pricing mechanisms for selected "strategic crops", defined as those for which government establishment set purchasing prices from farmers or cooperatives. Such a definition includes food-crops, namely wheat, barley, sugar beet, lentils and chickpeas, as well as cash-crops, like cotton and tobacco.

The rationale for analyzing strategic agricultural policies relies primarily on the dominant role such commodities play in Syrian agricultural sector: according to FAO analysis<sup>1</sup> their cultivations occupy 75.7 percent of total cultivated land in Syria, and 74.4 percent of irrigated land. Though the contribution of strategic crops to value creation is not as high as their proportional usage of land, their production still accounts for over half of total value of all crops.

Given that state intervention has an impact on government budget, we deem it useful to recall in the table below costs and benefits of price-intervention measures for the three most important strategic crops: wheat, cotton and sugar. The figures that emerge are quite suggestive of the scope for improving existing policies and favoring more efficient ways to achieve national objectives, be they stated in terms of food self-sufficiency or of redistribution of resources towards rural areas.

Particularly in this historical moment, when Syria is undertaking a process of transition towards a social market economy, government losses amounting to nearly 5 percent of GDP constitute a warning

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<sup>1</sup> See: Mike Westlake; "Final Report on strategic Crops' Subsector"; FAO; April 2001; Damascus

sign of inefficiency. On the other hand implicit taxation on domestic textile industry comes at odds with the effort of Syrian economy to diversify its productive and export base, moving towards higher value-added products.

All such consideration point to the need to reform existing agricultural policies, however, given the crucial significance of agricultural employment and farmers' income to reduce poverty, as well as the importance of food-crops in the dietary intake of Syrian poor<sup>2</sup>, any decision on

agricultural policies should pay great attention to the socio-economic impacts of such measures.

The importance of strategic agricultural policies in term of distribution of income and regional disparities is even more evident from the fact that most production comes from the Governorates of Al HassakeH, Al Raqqa, Aleppo, Hama and Idleb. As assessed by the UNDP study "Poverty in Syria", many of these Governorates show a large incidence of poverty especially in rural areas, and they are located in the most deprived region of Syria: the Northern-Eastern, where 58.1 percent of Syrian poor live.

A proof of this is given by the fact that in 2003-2004 the poverty headcount ratios were respectively 10.09 percent in Al Hassake, 17.59 percent in Al Raqqa, 19.88 percent in Aleppo, 11.57 percent in Hama, and 9.81 percent in Idleb, compared to a national average of 11.39 percent.

The effect of state intervention on producers' prices can be summarized in the table below, which shows the extent of price distortions for the principal strategic crops. It is evident that price distortion are extremely high in the case of sugar beet, wheat (both soft and hard) and cotton, with official prices far above market level so as to stimulate domestic production. On the contrary, in the case of lentils and chickpeas the official price is well below the market one, so that farmers normally sell their production to private traders instead of public establishments.

#### Cost and beneficiaries of government intervention

	Billion SP	Percentage of GDP
<b>WHEAT (1999)</b>		
GCM loss	26,29	3,24
Subsidy to farmers	10,80	1,33
Subsidy to consumers	1,98	0,24
<b>COTTON (1998 - 1999)</b>		
CMO loss	6,42	0,79
Subsidy to farmers	9,88	1,22
Implicit tax on domestic industry	2,30	0,28
<b>SUGAR (1999)</b>		
GEC loss	3,72	0,46
Subsidy to farmers	1,55	0,19
Subsidy to consumers	1,63	0,20
<b>TOTAL</b>		
Losses	36,43	4,49
Subsidies to farmers	22,23	2,74
Subsidies to consumers	3,61	0,44
Implicit tax on domestic industry	2,30	0,28

**Table 1:** Source "Final Report on strategic Crops' Subsector"; FAO; 2001

<sup>2</sup> At national level, it is estimated that 38 percent of the poor were engaged in agriculture in 2003-2004.

As regards instead the importance of cereals and sugar in the diet, estimates show that these two categories account for over 60% of the caloric intake of the reference food bundle for the poor. See H. Laithy, K. Abu Ismail; "Poverty in Syria"; UNDP 2005

In practice, existing pricing policies and marketing systems for strategic commodities differ widely

	Comparison of Official to Parity Producers Prices (Sp/ton)						
	Soft Wheat	Hard Wheat	Barley	Lentils	Chickpeas	Cotton*	Sugar*
Official Producer Price	10,800	11,800	7,500	16,000	17,800	29,290	2,150
Parity Producer Price	6,497	7,199	7,316	18,799	28,852	22,291	746
Ratio official to parity	1.66	1.64	1.03	0.85	0.62	1.31	2.88

\* Actual mean producer price after the adjustment of the official base prices for quality premiums and discounts

Table 2 Source: Final report on Strategic crops' subsector, FAO, 2001

from one another, though sharing two common and distinctive objectives: improving national food self-sufficiency and sustaining agricultural income. Despite the similarities, we deem it appropriate to briefly recall the specific marketing and pricing mechanisms for each strategic crop, to better clarify the rationale for a deeper analysis on their distributional impact.

**Wheat** is mainly marketed by the public enterprise General Establishment for Cereals Processing and Trade (GECPT), which absorbs around 70 percent of farmers' production<sup>3</sup>, paying it at an official price set highly above international levels (as shown in table 2). Wheat is then processed by the state-owned General Company for Mills (GCM) and by several private mills, to produce "standard" and "high quality" flour, which in turn are used respectively to bake "standard" and "high quality" bread. While prices for "high quality" flour and bread are controlled but not explicitly subsidized, the official prices for "standard" flour and bread are heavily subsidized, a situation that imposes on the GCM and on government budget losses for over 3 percent of GDP<sup>4</sup>. It is worth saying that the combination of producer and consumer subsidies results in a net subsidization on bread relatively small compared with free market price, since the principal effect of consumer subsidies is to offset the higher price paid to wheat farmers.

**Barley** is grown almost completely on rainfed land, and its production covers approximately 75 percent of domestic demand, though with considerable variation from year to year depending on weather conditions. Farmers can sell their production either to private traders and feed millers, or to the General Establishment for Cereals Processing and Trade (GECPT), which continues to act as a buyer of last resort at a fixed pan-national price set slightly above import parity level. The GECPT keeps strategic reserves for use at time of shortage, and sells the rest of its barley to the General Establishment for Feed (GEF), which in turn either processes it in public owned mills, or simply supplies livestock producers and feed millers. GEF final prices have been set below its buying prices with the aim of subsidizing livestock production, and the consequent losses are covered by a combination of government transfers plus cross subsidization from other profitable activities.

In the late 90's the private import of barley has been allowed by the government, and are monitored by the GEF, which issues licenses to fill the domestic market with adequate supply. Despite low

<sup>3</sup> The remaining 30 percent of the production is directly sold to private mills, a practice that although technically illegal is widely tolerated.

<sup>4</sup> Estimates show that retail standard bread in 2000 costed officially 8.50 SP/kg, while its import parity price was 10.51 SP/kg, causing the state-owned GCM to lose 26.29 billion of SP in 1999. Ibid.

tariffs on barley import, time-consuming customs procedures coupled with strict quality requirements turn barley import into a risky activity.

**Lentils and chickpeas** can be sold by farmers either to private sector, at prevailing market prices, or to the GECPT at an official price, which has long been fixed below international market level<sup>5</sup>. Since private trading of lentils and chickpeas is allowed both domestically and for export, unlike for wheat, this situation has encouraged the private sector participation in trade. At the same time, the price gap created an incentive for farmers to sell to private actors, thus building on the existing comparative advantage (see AAVV; "Syrian Agricultural Trade 2004"; National Agricultural Policy Center; 2005).

**Sugar beet** domestic production (covering some 20 percent of demand for sugar) can only be sold to the Ministry of Industry's General Organization for Sugar, which is also the solely processor. GOS then sells its refined sugar to the General Establishment for Consumption at a mark-up price, and such product is then supplied to the retail market through a subsidized ration programme. While the ration scheme utilized all domestically produced sugar plus additional import, the rest of the domestic demand is covered entirely by import. The subsidization mechanisms results in an official producer price for sugar beet that is three times as high as the parity producer price, while the official price for refined sugar was set at 60 percent of the corresponding import parity price. Likewise in the case of wheat, such a distortion affected the intermediate producer, the state-owned GEC, causing losses as large as 0.46 percent of GDP<sup>6</sup>.

**Cotton** produced by farmers is to be sold to the Cotton Market Organization (from the Ministry of Economy and Trade), which is the sole buyer and ginner, but also the sole exporter allowed to trade cotton fiber. Prices paid to farmers for seed cotton are set at twice their parity producer price, for cotton cultivated in respect of the agricultural plan, while the CMO pays the world price for cotton originating outside the planned land allocation<sup>7</sup>. As regards cotton fibre for domestic sales, CMO charges a monopoly price far higher than the import parity ex-ginnery, with an implicit taxation for the textile industry of 28,470 SP/ton. Despite the above form of national taxation, the CMO reported in 1999 losses for about 0.79 percent of GDP, mainly attributable at the losses in the export of cotton fibre.

**Tobacco** is cultivated on both rainfed and irrigated land, and yields showed a marked increase during the last decade. Farmers are obliged to sell their production to the General Organization for Tobacco, which owns processing plants in Lattakia, Hama, Aleppo and Damascus. The GOT manufactures cigarettes that are sold at a mark up prices in the domestic market, through distributors and retailers. While the majority of Syrian tobacco is sold in the domestic market, a variable proportion of the crop is exported, principally in the form of leaves.

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<sup>5</sup> According to FAO estimates, in the year 2000 import-parity producer prices for lentils and chickpeas were respectively 18,799 SP/ton and 28,852, while official government prices are fixed since 1996 at 16,000 SP/ton and 17,800 SP/ton. See: AAVV; "Syrian Agriculture at the crossroads"; FAO; 2003

<sup>6</sup> FAO estimates that import-parity producer prices for sugar beet were 746 SP/ton in 1999, while official government prices reached 2,150 SP/ton. For refined sugar, instead, official prices were set at 7,000 SP/ton whereas import-parity producer prices reached 12,718 SP/ton. Such a distortion led the General Establishment for Consumption to lose for 3.72 billion of SP in 1999. Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> For 1998/1999, estimates set the parity producer prices for seed cotton at 19,128 SP/ton, while official prices were set at 29,200 SP/ton. Ibid.



While the above paragraphs represent an extremely concise and limited description of the pricing and marketing mechanisms for strategic crops, it is clear that the PSIA will necessarily select some of these commodities for investigation and delve deeper in their analysis. Such a selection will reflect not just the variety of measures and institutions at stake, but also the different role played by each specific crop in production and consumption pattern as well as their importance for the transformation industry.

The precise identification of the commodities to be analyzed will constitute the first step of the PSIA process, and will be done in close consultation with all stakeholders.

Coherently with the scope of the PSIA, the selection of the commodities will follow three criteria:

- Relevance of the intervention for the welfare of the poor. Households are affected by the agricultural prices both as producers and as consumers; therefore, according to the relative importance of each commodity in prevailing consumption and production patterns, price changes will affect the poor at different degrees. The PSIA will favor those commodities that are more important for the wellbeing of the poor, (typically, but not necessarily, food crops).
- Impact of the subsidization on the government budget. As recalled briefly above, the bulk of government losses is linked essentially to the pricing mechanisms for three commodities: wheat, sugar beet and cotton. Accordingly the PSIA will prioritize those commodities whose subsidization is more costly in terms of government resources, with particular consideration for the losses incurred by public establishments in charge of monopsonistic and/or monopolistic marketing.
- Role played by the subsidization in terms of redistribution. As a consequence of the heterogeneous geographical distribution of different crops, specific pricing mechanisms also act as means to redistribute financial resources to the rural areas which happen to be net producers of the subsidized commodities. The prioritization of strategic crops should thus take into account the impact of subsidization mechanisms in terms of regional imbalances and urban-rural gap.

In line with the three criteria mentioned, there are reasons to anticipate that barley and tobacco will not be included in the key commodities to be analyzed. Indeed barley is chiefly used for animal feed, and thus has only an indirect impact on the standard of living of the poor; moreover the data presented above show that the price distortions concerning barley are limited, so that the likely impact of a reform may also be expected to be modest. For tobacco, instead, the modest impact of the reform is rooted in the minimal percentage of rainfed or irrigated land dedicated to its cultivation (respectively 0.4 and 0.6 percent).

### ***Target Beneficiaries***

Immediate beneficiaries of this intervention will be the concerned Government bodies, above all the State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, as well as other in line ministries whose mandate is related to the issue of subsidization of strategic crops: the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. The project will indeed provide policy-makers with evidence-based analysis of the different policy options, enabling them to assess the economic and distributional impact of reforms.

Moreover government officials appointed to the Task Force will benefit from extensive training on PSIA methodology, and on tools and methods for analysis (depending on the specific needs and skills, the topics of the technical training sessions will range from Institutional and Stakeholder to Econometric and Statistical models).

The focus on building in-country-capacities to conduct PSIA will be further reinforced by the fact that local government experts will be exposed to prolonged learning-by-doing, and on-the-job-training. In this regard, the project will represent an important step in transferring technical knowledge and improving the competencies and skills of relevant authorities.

As regards the indirect beneficiaries, the Syrian population will benefit from the project in two different ways:

1. being able to participate more actively in the debate on agricultural policies,
2. being subject to more efficient mechanisms of support for strategic agricultural production and food security.

The increased participation in the political debate represents one of the outputs of the project, and will be ensured by the timely dissemination of the findings and by specific activities to promote the discussion of policy alternative among all stakeholders. The second benefit mentioned above, is instead a long-term benefit, and can be identified with the outcome of the project.

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## PART 1B STRATEGY

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### ***Government strategy***

At a political level, the PSIA project is perfectly aligned with the Government objectives of leading and managing a gradual transition towards a social market economy, relying more heavily on market signals but without hindering the traditional interventions in favor of poverty eradication and equitable distribution of resources. In light of this national strategy, the PSIA project is intended to provide the Syrian Government with in-country capacity and sound analytical tools to forecast the social impact of economic reforms, thereby contributing to a more aware decision-making process.

Concerning the agricultural policy for strategic crops, the Tenth National Five-Year Plan for 2006-2010 reaffirmed the intention to carry on state interventions in pricing and marketing mechanisms, in order to increase both production and yield<sup>8</sup>, and stimulate investment and capital accumulation to modernize the national agricultural sector.

Nevertheless, it is widely recognized, from an economic point of view, the need to fine-tune pricing and marketing conditions to present market trends (this demand is particularly strong in the case of wheat, whose official prices have been fixed since 1996<sup>9</sup>), while adopting more efficient mechanisms

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<sup>8</sup> The targets set by the National Five-Year Plan for increase in production are: 2.6 percent for grain, 0.49 percent for cotton and 1.6 percent for sugar beet.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

to provide incentives for the introduction of new high-yield cultivations and achieve the strategic targets stated in the National Agricultural Plan.

On the other hand, it is also accepted that the rationale for reforms emerges clearly from the fact that existing policies certainly support a broad access to food-commodities, and basically redistribute resources in favor of rural areas (which are net-producer); however their efficiency may be improved by better targeted measures guaranteeing a more cost-effective support to the poor segments of the population.

Moreover, the PSIA initiative on agricultural subsidization is also in line with the strategy of the National Five-Year Plan for poverty reduction: indeed, the Plan recognizes the role of the agricultural sector as pivotal in increasing job and income opportunities of the poor. Furthermore, poverty reduction strategies will explicitly pay a special attention to the Northern-Eastern region that, as we saw, also constitutes the main producing area for many strategic crops.

For all these reasons, the PSIA initiative can be a useful instrument to translate government strategies into well-designed and carefully analyzed policy reforms.

### ***Project strategy***

The **project outcome** aims ultimately at supporting the Syrian Government in assessing the social and distributional impact of reforms concerning the pricing and marketing mechanisms for strategic crops, hence promoting an evidence-based debate among stakeholders on the alternative paths of reform.

While the PSIA of agricultural policies for strategic crops is the principal focus of the project, the analysis should however be carried out as a sort of “pilot phase”, with a constant focus on building the capacity of the national Government to replicate similar PSIA to other types of reforms. In this perspective, this initiative relies on a “learning-by-doing approach”, and is thus intended to provide national policy-makers with a valuable set of methods and tools for reflecting distributional and developmental concern in the entire decision making process.

To achieve the named project outcome, the PSIA initiative will focus on three **intended outputs**

**Output I:** In-country capacity to analyze subsidy policies and to carry out PSIA initiatives created, both at managerial and at technical level.

This component of the project includes all activities needed to set up a PSIA Task Force, train its members on PSIA framework and methodologies, as well as on technical tools and methods for the social and economic analysis.

The indicators for output I are:

- # of training hours devoted to PSIA structure and methodologies;
- # of training hours devoted to Stakeholders and Institutional Analysis (only for the Social Analysis Core Team);
- # of training hours devoted to Econometric Tools and Methods (only for the Economic Analysis Core Team).

Main deliverables of this output include:

- training module about PSIA structure and methodologies (for the entire TF);
- Current subsidies analysis conducted and alternative subsidization and targeting mechanisms for strategic crops identified
- training module about Stakeholders and Institutional Analysis for the Institutional Analysis Core Team;
- training module about Econometric Tools and Methods for the Economic Analysis Core Team).

**Output II:** Economic policies concerning strategic crops analyzed, with particular attention to the distributional and social impact of reforms.

This output comprises all tasks needed to carry out the PSIA on strategic agricultural crops in Syria; from data collection and literature review (in close coordination with other institutional stakeholders), to the development and calibration of the Multi-market and Household models. These econometric tools will then be used to assess the distributional impact of reforms involving price or marketing mechanisms, their consequences in terms of regional disparities and poverty reduction.

In addition, through output II the project will provide technical assistance to the Government in the analysis of the overall structure of agricultural subsidization system, with particular reference to its financing, to the alternative mechanisms for subsidization and targeting, and to its impacts on national food security and introduction of new high-yield crops.

The indicators for output II are:

- # of seminars to validate PSIA methodologies and preliminary findings;
- # of alternative reform scenarios analyzed;
- # of studies conducted on the agricultural subsidization system in Syria.

Main deliverables of this output include:

- Multi-market model calibrated to Syrian agricultural productive structure;
- Household model calibrated to Syrian micro- data;
- Report on "Alternative Subsidization and Targeting mechanisms for strategic crops";
- Report on "Agricultural subsidization, introduction of new high-yield crops and food security".
- Report on "Mechanisms for financing agricultural subsidies"

**Output III:** Findings of PSIA on strategic crops disseminated, and public debate about reforms proposed among stakeholders.

This output deals more closely with the refining of the analysis according to the feedbacks of institutional stakeholders, and subsequently with the fostering of an open debate, based on empirical evidence, concerning policy reforms for strategic crops. The main objective of this component is to promote the participation of stakeholders (both institutional and non-institutional) in the decision-making process, favoring the consensus-building by mean of

ex-ante evaluation of the distributional income of those reforms on the table. This will be done through a series of workshops and events during which the distributional effects of alternative reform path will be illustrated to a non-technical audience and to the public opinion.

The indicators for output III are:

- # of workshops conducted on PSIA findings;

Main deliverables of this output include:

- Multi-market model fine-tuned according to the results of the technical stakeholders' meetings;
- Household model fine-tuned and discussed in the technical stakeholders' meetings;
- Consolidated PSIA report.

**Activities for output I** will be aimed at establishing and training a PSIA Task Force within the Syrian Government. The PSIA TF will be composed of 15-20 qualified officials appointed by the SPC, the MAAR and the MOF among social scientists, agricultural experts and economists.

Once the TF is established, all members will be trained by qualified consultants on

1. PSIA structure and methodology,
2. Risk Assessment, and
3. Monitoring and Evaluation.

This module will last for an overall period of a month, considering both the frontal training session and time spent in reviewing case studies.

At the end of the introductory module, the members of the TF will be divided into two groups according to their competencies: a SOCIAL ANALYSIS CORE TEAM, and ECONOMIC ANALYSIS CORE TEAM. This division will allow PSIA TF members to be trained extensively on the relevant tools and methods of analysis, which include respectively

- Stakeholder Analysis, Institutional Analysis and Social Impact Analysis, as attains the Social Analysis Core Team;
- Direct Impact Analysis, Behavioral Models, Partial Equilibrium Models, General Equilibrium Models, linking Micro-data to Macro Models, as attains the Economic Analysis Core Team.

The second training modules will proceed at the same time for the two different Core Teams, and will last an overall period of two months; particular attention will have to be devoted to hand-on training and the review of practical case studies, in order to let TF member familiarize with the models they will need to utilize in Syrian case.

**Activities for output II** will instead focus on carrying out the PSIA on strategic crops, and on the analysis of specific ad-hoc issues concerning the agricultural subsidization in Syria. Activities related to output II will start with a series of close consultations with relevant institutional stakeholders (including ICARDA, Syrian Farmers Union, Ministry of Economy and Trade, Central Bureau of Statistics and academics); these discussion sessions will be aimed at validating the methodologies to

be applied in the studies, collecting existing data (assessing the need for new data, if needed) and designing the implementation plan for the PSIA.

Once this phase will be completed, the PSIA TF will prepare an Implementation Plan for the entire process; members of the two Core Teams will carry out their respective analysis accordingly, benefiting from the help and supervision of highly qualified consultants identified and recruited in collaboration with UNDP and WB.

Given the scope of the analysis, the methodological approach will employ a Multi-market model, to grasp the effects of different reform-alternatives on economic variables such as: prices and production levels of strategic crops, land usage, regional production patterns, etc. The findings of this partial equilibrium model will be then combined with a household model, able to forecast the representative behavioral responses of household units (both as producers and consumers) to changes in prices and / or in marketing mechanisms.

The TF will also rely on the household level data collected for the UNDP sponsored study "Poverty in Syria"; this will allow the results concerning macro-variables (prices and production levels) or representative agents (the microeconomic household) to be complemented by distributional and poverty considerations.

In addition to this, and as specified in the RRF, output II will also comprise the technical support to the Government in examining essential aspects of the agricultural subsidization system in Syria: namely

- Alternative subsidization and targeting mechanisms applicable in the case of Syrian strategic crops
- Available mechanisms to finance agricultural subsidization, and
- the relation between agricultural subsidization, introduction of new high-yield crops and food security.

These studies should be intended as a contribution to the overall understanding of agricultural subsidization in Syria, and are meant to provide the PSIA TF with valuable and sound information to analyze reforms in a broader perspective.

**Activities for output III** will start with the technical presentation of the preliminary results achieved to the relevant institutional stakeholders, in order to receive comments, suggestions and feedbacks; such contribution will be subsequently used to fine-tune the models and do the needed amendments. Such a step will be important to validate the analysis done so far and ensure a reasonable agreement also on the interpretation and policy recommendations.

The analysis carried out, duly reviewed according to the discussion with institutional stakeholders, will then be consolidated by the PSIA TF into a comprehensive report, covering both institutional and economic dimensions of the reforms, assessing risks and eventually proposing mitigation mechanisms.

The PSIA report will finally be published, and presented in the occasion of three grassroots-level workshops to be conducted in key areas of the country, according to Syrian agricultural structure (Damascus – major area in deficit of cereals-, Hassake – major area of cereals production - and Aleppo – commercial center).

## *UNDP strategy*

The rationalization of the agricultural policies, and the correction of the inefficiencies due to subsidization mechanisms represent a challenge posed to Syria by its economic structure and by the current process of economic transition from a planned economy to a social market economy. While Syria certainly has a comparative advantage in agricultural commodities (despite the scarcity of water resources), macroeconomic policies certainly need to be fine-tuned and rationalized to cope with the risks and opportunities brought by globalization, without hindering pro-poor policies and exerting excessive pressure on the environment.

UNDP Syria has already been assisting in a number of occasions the efforts of the Syrian government to cope with the challenges of the economic transition, promoting an inclusive growth and a constant attention to the poorest segments of the population. The formulation of the Tenth National Five Year Plan is probably the most notable of such examples of collaboration; however despite the work done many of the challenges of the transition process are still ahead

In this regard, the reforms to be analyzed through the PSIA constitute the pillars of Syrian economic policy not just for the agricultural sector, but also for food-security and pro-poor growth; therefore they are closely linked with the achievement of MDG 1 of eradicating poverty and hunger. In light of this, the PSIA does indeed fit perfectly with the MYFF goal number 1: "Achieving the MDGs and reducing human poverty", and specifically to the core result "Human development concerns and dimensions to benefit the poor reflected in policies and strategies addressing the impact of globalization", service line 1.4 (globalization benefiting the poor).

The strategic relationship between MYFF Goal, Service Line, MYFF Core Result, and project outcome or / and outputs are clarified in the Strategic Results Framework, as per diagram below.

Given its close link with the reforms envisaged in the Tenth National Five-Year Plan and more generally in the political agenda, the PSIA will represent a chance to build useful synergies with other ongoing projects, namely

- "Capacity Development for the State Planning commission and Assistance in the Formulation of the Tenth Five-Year Plan",
- "Technical & Logistical Support to the Implementation of the 10th Five-Year Plan of Syria", and
- "Support to the development of a 20-year vision: Syria 2020" (as attains the influence of pricing and marketing systems for strategic crops on transformation industries, mainly mills, sugar refineries and bakeries),

The specific focus of the PSIA on poverty and social dimension, will moreover allow to build up on the achievements of the previous UNDP programmes, which developed a baseline to investigate poverty-related issues in Syria:

- "Macroeconomic policies for poverty reduction: the case of Syria", and
- "Poverty in Syria".


Within this overall strategy, and given the comparative advantages of Syria Country Office, UNDP role will concentrate on the support to the overall coordination of the PSIA process.

In particular, UNDP support will focus on:

- (I) providing technical assistance to enhance the participation of civil society in the discussion of the reforms, while guaranteeing that the PSIA will be closely linked to the poverty reduction strategies of the Tenth Five Year Plan and the recommendations from previous studies on poverty in Syria;
- (II) supporting the recruitment of qualified consultants to undertake the training and the PSIA;
- (III) ensuring a close coordination with World Bank (since no WB representatives are currently settled in Syria); and
- (IV) supporting the overall management, monitoring and evaluation of the project.

Furthermore, through both its projects related to the National Five Year Plan, namely: "Capacity Development of the SPC and Assistance in the Formulation of the Five-Year Plan" Technical & Logistical Support to the Implementation of the 10th Five-Year Plan of Syria" , UNDP will contribute to ensure that the analytical study will be reflected in actual decision-making.





***World Bank strategy***

As discussed with the Washington-based Lead Economist in charge of Syria, WB support will focus on its comparative advantages in terms of expertise, familiarity with PSIA processes and availability of advanced training materials on relevant issues.

Hence the role of WB concerning the PSIA project will therefore be crucial in:

- (I) Providing technical assistance to support all various steps of the technical analysis and ensure a constant adherence to the appropriate methodologies.
- (II) Facilitating the training process through sharing training materials, case studies of PSIA already conducted in other countries, econometric and statistical softwares (if needed), available data and studies on relevant issues in Syrian economy;
- (III) Assisting in the recruitment of highly qualified experts to carry out selected consultancies and studies.

As was pointed out in preliminary discussions, from WB point of view strong synergies can be created between this proposed PSIA and other ongoing activities such as the PSIA on energy subsidies in Syria (with the collaboration of the State Planning Commission), and the comprehensive Public Expenditure Survey planned for the coming fiscal year.

Clearly all these interventions aim at providing a qualified support to Syrian Authorities in managing the transition towards a social market economy, while taking in due considerations social and distributional issues.

PART 2 PROJECT RESULTS & RESOURCES FRAMEWORK

Intended Outputs	Indicative Activities	Detailed Activities	Inputs
<p>Output 1 : In-country capacity to carry out a PSIA initiative created, both at managerial and at technical level.</p>	<p>1.1 Set up of the PSIA Coordination Unit.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Select the Project Coordinator and the Admin-Finance Assistant.</li> <li>• Ensure the appropriate coordination system with other line ministries.</li> <li>• Appoint the PSIA TF members, comprising social scientists, economists or statisticians and agricultural economists.</li> </ul>	<p>Recruitment of Project Coordinator US\$ 1,000 * 12 months = 12,000 US\$ Recruitment of Admin-Finance Assistant US\$ 600 * 12 months = 7,200 US\$  Miscellaneous expenses 500 US\$</p>
	<p>1.2 Conduct a training session for the entire government TF about PSIA framework and methodology, Risk Assessment and Monitoring and Evaluation.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prepare the TOR for technical assistance in the training.</li> <li>• Identify the consultants/trainers.</li> <li>• Collect training materials, information on practical case studies etc.</li> <li>• Translate the core training material into Arabic.</li> </ul>	<p>Local Consultant Fees 2,500 US\$  Contractual Services (Translation) 1,500 US\$</p>
	<p>1.3 Conduct a training session about tools and methods for Institutional and Stakeholders' Analysis, for the social scientists</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prepare the TOR for technical assistance in the training.</li> <li>• Identify the consultants/trainers.</li> </ul>	<p>International Consultant Fees 400 US\$ * 20 days = 8,000 US\$ Travel Expenses 1,500 US\$</p>

	<p>appointed in the government TF.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collect training materials, information on practical case studies etc.</li> <li>• Translate the core training material into Arabic.</li> </ul>	<p>DSA * 20 days 3,400US\$</p>
<p>1.4 Conduct a training session about tools and methods for Economic Analysis for the economists, statisticians and agricultural experts appointed in the government TF.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prepare the TOR for technical assistance in the training.</li> <li>• Identify the consultants/trainers.</li> <li>• Collect training materials, information on practical case studies etc.</li> <li>• Conduct hand-on training sessions on various case studies to familiarize with specific softwares and methods.</li> </ul>	<p>International Consultant Fees 400 US\$ * 25 days = 10,000 US\$ Travel Expenses 1,500 US\$ DSA * 30 days 4,250 US\$</p> <p>Local Consultant Fees 6,000 US\$</p>	<p><b>Total output I : US\$ 58,350</b></p>
<p>Output 2 : Economic policies concerning strategic crops analyzed, with particular attention to the distributional and social impact of reforms.</p>	<p>2.1 Assist in-line ministries with ad hoc consultancies as required for the study of alternative subsidization and targeting mechanisms.</p> <p>2.2 Provide technical assistance in</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prepare the TOR for the required consultancies.</li> <li>• Identify the consultants.</li> <li>• Produce a report on alternative subsidization and targeting mechanisms.</li> <li>• Prepare the TOR for the</li> </ul>	<p>International Consultant Fees 400 US\$ * 20 days = 8,000 US\$ Travel Expenses 1,500 US\$ DSA * 30 days 3,400 US\$</p> <p>International Consultant Fees</p>

	<p>studying the mechanisms for financing agricultural subsidies.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• required consultancies. Identify the consultants.</li> <li>• Produce a report on food security, subsidization and other agricultural policies for strategic crops in Syria.</li> </ul>	<p>400 US\$ * 25days = 10,000 US\$  Travel Expenses  1,500 US\$  DSA * 30 days  4,250 US\$</p>
<p>2.3 Provide technical assistance to in-line ministries for the study of the relation between agricultural subsidization, introduction of new high-yield crops and food security.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prepare the TOR for the required consultancies.</li> <li>• Identify the consultants.</li> <li>• Produce a report on food security, subsidization and other agricultural policies for strategic crops in Syria.</li> </ul>	<p>International Consultant Fees  10,400 US\$  Travel Expenses  1,500 US\$  DSA * 25 days  4,250 US\$</p>	
<p>2.4 Prepare the Implementation Plan for the analysis, review existing literature and fill the need for updated or new data.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consult institutional stakeholders to prepare the Implementation Plan for the analysis, collect data and validate the methodologies to be applied.</li> <li>• Review existing literature and data available, assessing the need for new data (if needed).</li> <li>• Collect new data (if needed).</li> </ul>	<p>Miscellaneous expenses  800 US\$</p>	
<p>2.5 Develop the Stakeholder and Institutional Analysis.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prepare the TOR for technical assistance in the institutional</li> </ul>	<p>International Consultant Fees  400 US\$ * 25 days = 10,000 US\$</p>	

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• analysis.</li> <li>• Identify the consultants.</li> <li>• Carry out the analysis.</li> <li>• Produce a report on the Institutional analysis.</li> </ul>	<p>Travel Expenses 2,000 US\$ DSA * 30 days 4,250 US\$</p> <p>International Consultant Fees 400 US\$ * 40 days = 16,000 US\$ Travel Expenses 4,000 US\$ DSA * 40 days 6,800 US\$</p> <p>Local Consultant Fees 4,500 US\$</p> <p><b><u>Total output II : US\$ 93,150</u></b></p>
<p>Output 3 : Findings of the PSIA disseminated, and public debate about reforms concerning strategic crops fostered among all stakeholders.</p>	<p>3.1 Consolidate and publish the PSIA report.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discuss the preliminary findings with institutional stakeholders.</li> <li>• Fine-tune the models to reflect feedbacks and comments.</li> <li>• Prepare the TOR for the local consultant assisting in the formulation of the report.</li> <li>• Identify the consultant.</li> <li>• Consolidate the social and economic part of the analysis in a comprehensive report.</li> </ul>	<p>Publications 2,000 US\$</p> <p>Local Consultant Fees 2,500 US\$</p>

	<p>3.2 Conduct 3 workshops with grassroots-level stakeholders to foster the participation of public opinion in the debate over agricultural sector reforms.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Publish the report.</li> <li>• Organize the venues and logistics.</li> <li>• Identify key-note speakers and moderators.</li> <li>• Prepare background material for the audience.</li> </ul>	<p>Logistic for workshops 9,100 US\$ Logistic for an additional workshop with academics (including Travel DSA and miscellaneous) 11,900 US\$ (out of which US 8,400 to be paid in Syrian pounds)</p> <p><b><u>Total output III : US\$ 25,500</u></b></p> <p><b>Total programme budget: US\$ 177,000</b> <b>GMS Fees: US\$ 3,000</b> <b>TOTAL BUDGET: US\$ 180,000</b></p>
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As explicitly stated in the procedures for accessing the funds from the Belgian-supported Global project on "Country-led PSIA", the project will be:

- **MANAGED** by the Bureau for Development Policy at UNDP,
- **EXECUTED** by UNOPS New York, and
- **IMPLEMENTED** by the Syrian National Government, namely by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, in coordination with the State Planning Commission.

According to the same procedures, the PSIA project is planned to run for one year commencing in September 2006 and ending in September 2007. The MAAR will provide office space and facilities for the project's task force (TF)\*. This space need not necessarily be in the Ministry Building, but the location should meet the following specifications:

- Space to accommodate 20 – 30 people
- Conference room
- Computer stations with sufficiently high specifications to support statistical and econometrical software,
- Internet and telephone connections with international access
- Basic furniture including desks, filing cabinets with locks, book shelves, conference tables, comfortable chairs and sofas.

The project will operate in accordance with UNOPS rules and regulations, including those for procurement and accounting. In addition, the following procedures will be applied to the disbursement of funds, as stated in the regulation of the Global project on "Country-led PSIA":

1. UNOPS New York will directly notify the Government representative, copying the UNDP Country Office, to begin requesting authorization for expenditures.
2. UNOPS New York will directly handle the recruitment of international consultants and the travel of UNDP or World Bank representatives if the leading government unit requests such assistance. These items should be specified in the project budget.
3. For recruiting national consultants or incurring local expenditures, such as holding a meeting, UNOPS New York will authorize the UNDP Country Office to contract for such services.

The Project Coordinator's selection will be made in accordance with UNDP's principles of transparency and openness, giving full and equal opportunities to all candidates. Selection should be made on a competitive basis with paramount consideration to efficiency, competence and integrity. Selection should also be made by consensus between the Government, WB and UNDP. While the recruitment of **international** consultants will be handled by UNOPS New York, the

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\* This will be the Ministry's in-kind contribution estimated at US\$ 20,000



selection of those consultants (i.e international) needs to be approved by the Government, UNDP, and the WB. The TORs for all staff including national and international consultants should clearly identify the outputs, remuneration and evaluation process and should be made by consensus between the Government, WB, and UNDP. There will be an assessment of the performance of the Project Coordinator and Admin-Finance Assistant, against criteria specified.

The Project Coordinator will be responsible for the overall management of the project, will coordinate the training sessions with UNDP, WB and external consultants, will ensure a timely and efficient information-sharing among the various institutions and will oversee the day-to-day operations of activities required to produce the project deliverables as per the Project Document. TOR for the Project Coordinator and the Admin-Finance Assistance are attached.

The management structure of the PSIA project will have at its top a **STEERING COMMITTEE FOR STRATEGIC CROPS**, composed by the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, the Ministry of Finance and the Head of State Planning Commission, and integrated by the UNDP Resident Representative and a WB Representative. The findings of the PSIA will be reported regularly and in detail to the Steering Committee, whose main tasks will include: supervising the overall work of the PSIA TF, and making sure that the results of the studies and consultations are fed properly into national policy decision-making.

The Steering Committee for Strategic Crops will directly supervise the activity of the **PSIA COORDINATION UNIT**, composed by a Project Coordinator and an Administrative Assistant appointed by the MAAR.

The PSIA Coordination Unit will be in charge of

- Leading, coordinating and supervising capacity building and research activities, as requested by the project document and the annual work plan;
- Manage day-to day activities of the project according to UNOPS and UNDP procedures;
- Coordinating with UNOPS, UNDP and WB for the recruitment of local and international consultant;
- Reporting to the Steering Committee, to UNDP and WB, and finally to the Tripartite Headquarters Committee. PSIA TASK FORCE, which will be the main body responsible for carrying out the Poverty and Social Impact Analysis on strategic crops.

The Project Coordinator will appoint a Deputy Coordinator among the members of the TF belonging to SPC, and the two will be respectively the Chairmen and Vice Chairmen of the PSIA TF.

The PSIA TF, will in turn be composed of 15-20 qualified officials appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (5-8 members)<sup>10</sup>, the State Planning Commission (5-8 members) and the ministry of Finance (3-5 members).

In order to be able to complete the tasks required for the PSIA, the TF needs to integrate people with the following background:

- 8 - 10 people with economic or statistical background;
- 5 - 8 agronomist, agricultural engineers or agricultural economist;
- 5 – 8 social scientists.

To enhance information sharing among the different Ministries and institutions, it is preferable that the MAAR and the SPC appoint at least one of their officials with each qualification.


As mentioned earlier, for the training modules on Tools and Methodologies and for all activities related to output II, the PSIA TF will be divided into

- an **INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS CORE TEAM**, and
- an **ECONOMIC ANALYSIS CORE TEAM**.

The former will be chaired by a member appointed by the SPC, will benefit of the training on Institutional and Stakeholder Analysis, and will carry out the Social Analysis related to agricultural subsidies.

The latter will be chaired by an Agricultural Specialist appointed by the MAAR, will attend the training on Tools and Methods for Economic Analysis, and will carry out the Economic Analysis related to the study of subsidies for strategic crops.

The Chairmen of the two Core Teams will also be requested to support the Coordination Unit whenever appropriate, and especially as regards the coordination of the training and the monitoring of research activities belonging to output II.



<sup>10</sup> Given the great deal of analysis on strategic crops already carried out within the National Agricultural Policy Centre (belonging to the MAAR), it is advisable that at least 1 member of the PSIA TF nominated by the MAAR belong to the NAPC.

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#### PART IV MONITORING AND EVALUATION

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Project monitoring will be done through comparing quarterly reports against the detailed annual work plan and progress reports. These Quarterly Reports will be presented by the Project Coordinator to the Steering Committee, and will be duly shared with UNDP Damascus and World Bank.

Apart from these quarterly ongoing monitoring, and as explicitly stated in the regulation of the Global project on "Country-led PSIA", the Project Coordinator with the support of the MAAR, the SPC and the MOF will prepare the annual report on the progress in implementing its PSIA project. This report, which should be intended as a final evaluation report, will be disseminated to the UNDP Resident Representative, the World Bank Lead Economist in Beirut and, if requested, the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Belgium.

The involved parties will duly share the report with the Headquarters Tripartite Committee of representatives of UNDP, World Bank and Belgian Development Cooperation, who will meet to review the progress report and the overall disbursement of funds and will recommend changes as needed.

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#### PART V LEGAL CONTEXT

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This project document shall be the instrument referred to as such in Article 1 of the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement between the Government of Syrian Arab Republic (S.A.R.) and the United Nations Development Programme, signed by the parties on 12 March 1981. The host-country implementing unit shall, for the purpose of the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement, refer to the government cooperating agency described in that agreement.

The following types of revisions may be made to this project document with the signature of the UNDP Resident Representative and of WB Representatives only, provided he has assured that the other signatories of the project document have no objections to the proposed changes:

- Revisions in, or additions of, any of the annexes of the project document; and
- Revisions, which do not involve significant changes in the immediate objectives, outputs or activities of the project, but are necessitated by the rearrangement of inputs already agreed to, or by cost increases due to inflation; and mandatory annual revisions, which re-phase the delivery of agreed project inputs or expert or other costs due to inflation or take into account expenditure flexibility.

If major changes (whether to increase or limit the project) are needed then a Substantive Revision Document will be prepared detailing the changes and all their implications. The Substantive Revision Document needs to be signed by all parties to the original project document.



## ANNEX 2

### TOR for Project Coordinator

**I. Background:** The project intends to support the Syrian Government in the ex-ante evaluation of the distributional impact of reforms concerning the pricing and marketing mechanisms for strategic crops. This step is crucial to ensure that poverty and social considerations are appropriately reflected in economic policy decision-making, and openly debated among stakeholders to favor the consensus building.

Adopting a “learning-by-doing approach”, the project also aims at strengthening the ownership of national authorities on the PSIA tools and processes, so that they may be replicated and adapted to other types of economic reforms.

This optic is reflected into three main project outputs:

- (I) Building in-country capacity to carry out PSIA initiatives;
- (II) Analyzing economic policies concerning strategic crops, with particular attention to the distributional and social impact of reforms;
- (III) Disseminating the findings of PSIA, and fostering public debate about reforms.

**II. Objective:** Under the direct supervision of the Steering Committee, and in close collaboration with UNDP and WB Experts, the Project Coordinator will be responsible for managing and supervising project activities and achieving the objectives stated in the project document. He will be in charge of coordinating the training modules and the research activities of the PSIA TF, of ensuring appropriate information sharing among all involved institutions (MAAR, SPC, MOF, UNDP and WB) and duly execute the annual work plan and implementation plan.

### **III. Responsibilities:**

#### **1) Management:**

- a) Assume operational management of the project in consistency with the project document and UNOPS rules and regulations including policies and procedures for agency executed projects;
- b) Manage project staff;
- c) Ensure that UNOPS rules and regulations are implemented in all projects’ activities, procurement and recruitment cases and others;
- d) Participate in all project meetings and annual reviews;
- e) Liaise with UNDP programme officer on daily/weekly basis to ensure proper monitoring and realizing results;
- f) Support resource mobilization efforts to increase resources in cases where additional outputs are required;
- g) Support to media/communications work of the project;
- h) Ensure that UNDP and WB are invited to all stakeholders’ meetings.

#### **2) Technical**

- a) Assume overall responsibility for the successful execution and implementation of the project towards achieving the outputs.
- b) Coordinate the work of the inter-ministerial PSIA TF, ensuring an effective and permanent coordination among MAAR, SPC and MOF.
- c) Liaise with UNDP and WB as necessary to coordinate the training modules, select the local / international consultants, and carry out the PSIA process and all related activities.
- d) Prepare detailed quarterly work plans;
- e) Obtain approval on quarterly work plan during its preparation from UNDP and present the quarterly report to the Project Steering Committee for approval.

- f) Plan and arrange, in consultation with UNOPS and UNDP, the procurement of project services in line with laid out process;
- g) Share with UNDP and WB draft document and outputs for comments, as well as final products.
- h) Prepare the Report on progress in implementing the PSIA project for the Tripartite Committee.

### 3) **Financial**

- a) Act on behalf of the executing agency in preparing and adjusting commitments and expenditures.
- b) Act as the sole authorizing officer for all project's financial transactions (i.e. approve all financial expenditures and sign all direct payments.)
- c) Authorize commitments of resources and expenditures for inputs including staff, consultants, goods and services and training
- d) Hold Responsibility for delivery of project's services and achieving annual financial delivery targets;
- e) Manage the project resources e.g. vehicles, office equipment, furniture and stationery procured under the project and maintain asset register;
- f) Ensure that appropriate accounting records are kept and organized;
- g) Facilitate and cooperate with audit requirements at all times, as required.

### 4) **Reporting**

- a) Prepare draft technical and other documents as required including the reporting on the following requirements:
  - Monthly and quarterly technical reports of progress on project activities and financial statements of expenditure for the project.
  - Annual project reports (APRs) and a Terminal Report at the end of the project in line with UNDP's formats.
  - Final financial report at the end of the project.
  - Technical, policy and briefing papers as requested by UNDP and the executing agency.
  - Any documents needed for the TPR meeting.

### 5) **Facilitation**

- a) Ensure that UNDP's and WB's name are mentioned in all publications, workshops, and project's activities;
- b) Serve as the focal point of the project for coordination of the project activities with UNDP, the Government and other partners on behalf of the project;
- c) Ensure that the Government inputs for the project are available;
- d) Lead efforts to build partnerships for the support of outputs indicated in the project document;
- e) Any other business as required.

**IV. Reporting Line:** - Contractually to the UNDP Resident Representative.  
 - Technically to the executing agency, WB, UNDP and the Steering Committee

**V. Evaluation:** Renewal of contract will be based on satisfactory midterm and final performance evaluation by UNDP and the executing agency.

**IX. Qualifications:**

- a) **Education:** Master degree (PhD is an asset) in Economics, Agricultural Economics or Agricultural Engineering; preferably with proven quantitative skills.
- b) **Experience:** 5 years of relevant experience at the national or international level in providing management advisory services, hands-on experience in design, monitoring and evaluation of development projects. Experience in the usage of computers and office software packages (MS Word, Excel, etc.)
- c) **Language Requirements:** Fluency in spoken and written English and the national language of the duty station.
- d) **Other Qualifications:** Good communication and presentation skills.